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Abstract: Organisations that offer personal services, whether this be 
a law firm or a hospital, may be extremely good at offering technical 
solutions to people, but when it comes to offering recognition, this is 
much more of a challenge. These institutions often lack the ability to ‘be 
respectful of each individual’.
Recognition is a central topic –often overseen– in the works of George 
Orwell, the English journalist and writer who, after taking part in the 
colonial system for five years, decided to ‘expiate his guilt’ by consecu-
tively becoming homeless, taking part in agricultural labor, writing on 
the living conditions of the English working class and fighting as a militia-
man in the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War. It was a process 
that spanned over several years, in which a well-educated, intellectually 
brilliant person, confronted and interacted with people of different coun-
tries and social backgrounds. The paper examines both failed and success-
ful recognition experiences in Orwell’s life and work, hoping to draw 
some insights in how recognition works in practice.
The analysis reveals two dramatic points and leads to a pessimistic con-
clusion: the first point, already presented in the first part of the article, is 
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that without recognition, no act of help will be really helpful. And sec-
ondly, real recognition only takes place between individuals. Which leads 
the author to conclude, confirming the initial suggestion of the paper, that 
full help cannot be given by any standardized procedure, and depends almost 
exclusively on the ability, commitment and willingness of individuals.
Keywords: Ethics of solidarity, Ethics of caregiving, George Orwell, 
Humanism
1. ‘BEING RESPECTFUL OF EACH INDIVIDUAL’
According to Román (2010: 122) standardized procedures and respect 
for the individual are natural enemies. Discussing ethics of caregiving, 
Román expressed this in the most explicit way: ‘depersonalisation takes 
place when the relationship [between patient and caregiver] is standardised 
for the smoothing running [sic] of the centre’. A centre that prioritizes 
its own procedures (and which centre does not?) will, willy-nilly, stop 
seeing the help-receiver as an individual. But Román was writing about 
caregiving to mentally disabled people: communication issues could be 
called upon (in a somewhat patronizing way) if one had to justify the 
inadequacy of the centre’s policy.
And when communication is challenged, recognition is challenged 
too. Consider now a case in the far-away field of law practice. Failinger, 
discussing how lawyers should address low-income clients, had to post, 
among others, such a basic question like ‘how can a lawyer and a client 
have a conversation which constitutes communication?’ (1999: 2074). 
One is tempted to reply maliciously: “By talking to each other?” Of 
course, the problem runs deeper. Failinger even has to quote Levinas in 
order to try to figure out the problem (and one, again maliciously, won-
ders whether a professional, theoretical philosopher will really be helpful 
in this or any other practical case). Because even when it is not impaired 
by speech issues or bad faith, communication is always difficult. It might 
be of use then to examine cases in which people successfully overcome 
gulfs of cultural, language and class issues, and are able to achieve recogni-
tion. That is what we intend to do by reading some of Orwell’s writings.
Recognition: The ability to see the other as an equal. And when rec-
ognition happens, it is painful not to treat the other the right way: the 
harm you do to the other is a harm you do to yourself.
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Petrini (2010: 2), in discussing public health ethics, resurfaces the 
problem: ‘Public health interventions can be ethically sound if they simul-
taneously meet the challenge of being respectful of each individual, not 
utilitarian, and practically effective’. Petrini is implying that there is, at 
least, a certain tension between being ‘respectful of each individual’, and 
applying the principle of utility. Recognition might not be cheap: if the 
utilitarian principle is not rigidly applied, things might not add up from 
the perspective of the economy. Both the mentality that says that benefits 
must be maximized, and (one may add) her twin sister, the technical mind 
(the ‘one best way’ set of mind), act against recognition. Utility cannot be 
the sole principle to be taken into account in public health policies, suggests 
Petrini. Why is that? Our claim, that we will try to validate through 
Orwell’s writings: because without recognition, which escapes the logic 
of utility and the technical mind, there cannot be any effective help. And 
so, any professional of personal services (caregivers, policemen, lawyers, 
teachers, social workers, you name it) needs to keep in mind the issue of 
recognition if he or she is to offer truly helpful help, a help beyond techni-
cal problem-solving. That seems to be a common concern among those 
who write on ethics of solidarity, of which the above-quoted articles are 
just a small sample.
How important is recognition when it comes to define solidarity? In 
their influential report, Prainsack and Buyx (2011: 47) stated that “soli-
darity comprises manifestations of the willingness to carry costs to assist 
others with whom a person recognizes sameness or similarity in at least 
one relevant respect” (my emphasis). And althought these authors stress 
the importance of actual help beyond internal feelings1, other authors, 
like Meulen (2016: 526) put recognition in the core of solidarity: ‘Solidar-
ity is the experience of recognition of one-self as a person with a particu-
lar identity in the intersubjective context of mutual recognition’, suggest-
ing that action goes in second place.
‘Solidarity suggests an active commitment to our common humanity’, 
so claimed Gallagher (2013: 500) when writing, for inspirational pur-
1 Cf. Prainsack, Buyx (2011), p.46: “It is important to note that solidarity is un-
derstood here as a practice and not merely as an inner sentiment or an abstract value. 
Solidarity requires actions. Motivations and feelings such as empathy etc. are not suf-
ficient to satisfy this understanding of solidarity, unless they manifest themselves in 
acts.”
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poses, an editorial on the importance and mission of the nurses2. Admit-
tedly, the way in which the claim is made does not turn out to be philo-
sophically sophisticated: it does not compare to Levinas’ subtleties. But 
the point is made sufficiently clear: solidarity is based on our common 
humanity. And therefore, all our ethics of solidarity problems revolve 
around the difficulties of making our common humanity felt when we 
try to help others: all our problems are connected to recognition.
2. RECOGNITION IN GEORGE ORWELL’S WORKS
Eric Arthur Blair –later known as George Orwell– was born in 1903 
in India. His father was a civil servant working in the Opium Department. 
His mother took him and his sister back to England the following year. 
He had a happy childhood until 1911, when he was boarded at St. 
Cyprian’s private preparatory school in Easbourne, Sussex. If his ‘Such, 
such were the joys’ is to be literally believed, in that school young Eric 
started to feel the terrors of psychological coercion, which would come 
handy when as an adult he started writing Nineteen Eighty-Four. In 1917 
he won a scholarship to the most prestigious and exclusive public school 
in England, Eton, where he remained until 1922. Instead of entering 
Oxford or Cambridge, which was the natural move after finishing the 
educational drill of Eton, he decided to join the Imperial Police in Burma, 
where he served for the next five years.
This was one of the most decisive periods of his life. Burma was 
socially and politically troubled by then, and the English living and 
working there faced a permanent and explicit hostility (See Meyers 
2001: 55-57). There he learnt what it means to lose one’s individuality: 
on the one hand, the natives would see in the English only the army of 
occupation they were, which reinforced the tendency of the English to 
act so, a point Orwell made masterfully in his narrative ‘Shooting an 
Elephant’, first published in 1936. The English had native servants and 
mistresses, but were not encouraged at all to have meaningful contacts 
with the Burmese. Although in his novel Burmese Days (1934), Or-
well makes the main character keep a close friendship with a Dr. Ver-
2 Gallagher also quoted Prainsack and Buyx’s definition of solidarity, leaving aside 
the idea of recognition of similarity and sameness, which she substituted with refer-
ences to “common humanity”.
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aswami –an Indian–, there were no significant contacts in Orwell’s life 
during that period – English or native (Meyers 2001: 62). On the 
other hand, an atmosphere of mutual surveillance was kept among the 
English themselves, to the effect that no one could express his doubts 
or utter any criticism to the colonial system. True friendship among 
the English had to face this particular difficulty as well. Only years 
later, Orwell would dare to criticise explicitly the imperial system he 
had served. In the short story, ‘A Hanging’, published in 1931, Orwell 
makes the point we are interested in: the difficulty of recognition. As 
a police officer, Orwell could attend executions3. One of them made a 
permanent impression in him; not because it was especially brutal or 
because it went wrong from the point of view of the procedures (leav-
ing aside a stray dog that interrupted momentarily the execution). It 
was just a minor detail, almost invisible, that made Orwell realise that 
it was a human life they were taking. On his way to the gallows, the 
prisoner stepped aside a little bit to avoid stepping on a puddle. Orwell 
(CW 10: 208)4:
‘It is curious, but till that moment I had never realized what it means 
to destroy a healthy, conscious man. When I saw the prisoner step aside 
to avoid the puddle, I saw the mystery, the unspeakable wrongness, of 
cutting a life short when it is in full tide. This man was not dying, he was 
alive just as we were alive. All the organs of his body were working — 
bowels digesting food, skin renewing itself, nails growing, tissues forming 
— all toiling away in solemn foolery. His nails would still be growing 
when he stood on the drop, when he was falling through the air with a 
tenth of a second to live. His eyes saw the yellow gravel and the grey 
walls, and his brain still remembered, foresaw, reasoned — reasoned even 
about puddles. He and we were a party of men walking together, seeing, 
hearing, feeling, understanding the same world; and in two minutes, with 
a sudden snap, one of us would be gone — one mind less, one world less.’
Admittedly, the whole narrative leaves a strong impression of artistic 
re-elaboration: the quote above is the central focus of the story, so pre-
3 Shelden (1991: 103) says that he could attend voluntarily any execution he 
wanted. Meyers (2000: 69) claims that Orwell saw only one execution, on the grounds 
that Orwell once published an article where he said: ‘I watched a hanged man once…’ 
in November 1944.
4 All of Orwell quotations are taken from professor Davison’s edition of the 
Complete Works, and referenced as CW, followed by the number of the volume and 
of the page.
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cisely set in the middle that only a very naïve reading could escape the 
impression of conscious literary construction. But the point is made: 
procedures act against recognition, are in fact devised to avoid rec-
ognition. Their sole purpose is smoothness and effectiveness. They are 
utilitarian: they serve the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This 
is very obvious when it comes to the procedures applied in executions: 
as in the above given example, no execution is to be carried out if the 
prisoner’s humanity was manifest. But one is left to wonder if our pro-
tocols in hospitals, police stations, nursing homes and the rest have the 
same purpose. Every now and then, though, a little, almost impercepti-
ble detail, reveals what procedures try to hide: the existence of human 
beings.
As soon as Orwell got a permission to go back to England, he resigned 
his position and for a period of five years he became a tramp, which he 
did intermittently while he was in England, and almost full time while 
he stayed in Paris. “I was conscious of an immense weight of guilt that I 
had got to expiate” (…) “I felt that I had got to escape not merely from 
imperialism but from every form of man’s dominion over man. I wanted 
to submerge myself, to get right down among the oppressed, to be one 
of them and on their side against their tyrants” (CW 5: 138). His tramp-
ing expeditions ended by 1932, when back in England he started to work 
as a school teacher; he also started his writing career.
His first book appeared in 1933. It was called Down and Out in 
Paris and London, and deals with his experiences as a tramp (it was with 
this book, his first English publication, when Orwell decided to use his 
pen name for the first time). Again, there is a lot of artistic re-elaboration, 
but most of the events are biographical (See Bowker, 2004: 144). Some 
of its passages speak volumes on how recognition is attained (or not). In 
the beginning we learn that, after pawning his best suit, in exchange of 
which Orwell got old, almost ragged clothes, he discovered how prejudice 
and appearances made recognition impossible (CW 1: 130):
‘My new clothes had put me instantly into a new world. Everyone’s 
demeanour seemed to have changed abruptly. I helped a hawker pick up 
a barrow that he had upset. ‘Thanks, mate’, he said with a grin. No one 
had called me mate before in my life –it was the clothes that had done it. 
For the first time I noticed, too, how the attitude of women varies with 
a man’s clothes. When a badly dressed man passes them they shudder 
away from him with a quite frank movement of disgust, as though he 
were a dead cat. Clothes are powerful things. Dressed in a tramp’s clothes 
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it is very difficult, at any rate for the first day, not to feel genuinely de-
graded. You might feel the same shame, irrational but very real, your 
first night in prison.’
A man educated in Eton is reduced, consecutively, to a fellow tramp 
and to a dead cat. Recognition is challenged by very superficial things we 
take for granted, but that are, indeed, ‘powerful things’.
Both procedure and prejudice work together to prevent recognition, 
to disastrous results even when help is intended. This is specifically made 
clear by a story in Down and Out in Paris and London. Orwell explains 
that, after being hungry for days, and having only little money, that he 
meant to stretch as long as possible, he and his fellow-tramp ‘Paddy’ 
decided to go to a church were tea and six slices of bread and margarine 
were offered. The tramps were supposed to stay for a service that would 
begin immediately after the food had been delivered. Evidently, the tramps 
sitting near the exit door would bolt to avoid the service, but the rest, out 
of lack of cheekiness, stayed. The scene Orwell describes, once the service 
is started, is both amusing and terrifying. The tramps sitting in the gallery 
above would chatter out loud, would stamp their feet, would even try to 
light cigarettes, and some would start throwing pellets of bread to the 
congregation below. The pastor, at some point, felt he had to address 
them to call for order, with a ‘I shall address the last five minutes of my 
sermon to the unsaved sinners!” (CW 1: 185), to no effect on his guilty 
audience. The tramps left the church as soon as the doors opened, exchang-
ing promises of coming back the following week. Orwell reflects on the 
whole experience like this (ibid.):
“It was a queer, rather disgusting scene. Below were the handful of 
simple, well-meaning people, trying hard to worship; and above were the 
hundred men whom they had fed, deliberately making worship impos-
sible. A ring of dirty, hairy faces grinned down from the gallery, openly 
jeering. What could a few women and old men do against a hundred 
hostile tramps? They were afraid of us, and we were frankly bullying 
them. It was our revenge upon them for having humiliated us by feed-
ing us” (my emphasis).
Help reaches those who need it, but they feel not helped at all. Quite 
the contrary, they feel abused and humiliated. Orwell drives it home by 
claiming, tremendously:
“A man receiving charity practically always hates his benefactor –it’s 
a fixed characteristic of human nature; and, when he has fifty or hundred 
others to back him, he will show it.” (CW 1:186)
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This reads as a pessimistic, hopeless claim on the predicament of the 
poor. Poverty would seem a permanent, unsurpassable mark: help is an 
affront. Recognition seems unattainable. However, it is Orwell himself, 
again resorting to his own experiences, who just a few lines below presents 
the reader with another case; this time he shows how it should be done:
‘At half past eight Paddy took me to the Embankment, where a cler-
gyman was known to distribute meal tickets once a week (…). Presently 
the clergyman appeared and the men ranged in a queue in the order in 
which they had arrived. The clergyman was a nice, chubby, youngish 
man (…). He was shy and embarrassed, and did not speak except for a 
brief good evening; he simply hurried down the line of men, thrusting a 
ticket upon each, and not waiting to be thanked. The consequence was 
that, for once, there was genuine gratitude, and everyone said that the 
clergyman was a good ---- feller. Someone (in his hearing, I believe) called 
out: “Well, he’ll never be a ----- bishop!” – this, of course, intended as a 
warm compliment.’ (CW 1: 186-7)
It is easy to see the difference: the pastor in his church was not giving 
freely; the clergyman in the Embankment was asking for nothing in re-
turn. But recognition doesn’t seem to spring exactly from that. The key 
phrase here is, I think, ‘he was shy and embarrassed’. The clumsy, infor-
mal way the clergyman helped the others –he was skipping all procedures 
and acting almost in secrecy–, and his embarrassment, made the difference. 
The clergyman was abandoning a sheltered position by going to the 
Embankment, not only physically speaking, but rather spiritually, which 
is actually much more difficult. To be unsheltered is something that can’t 
be attained by a conscious effort, it is, almost by definition, something 
that happens against one’s will.
The clergyman was obviously trying to help, but also wanted to get 
away as soon as possible. He felt uncomfortable, a feeling he didn’t man-
age to hide. He had been unsheltered by paying attention to whom was 
receiving his help. With genuine feelings of unsuitability, shared both by 
the helper and the helped, recognition was attained.
Now, both examples are unacceptable from the point of view of our 
standards of how the poor need to be helped. They are sheer acts of char-
ity; they offer only a temporary relief that will not contribute to improv-
ing the situation. But something unexpected happens in the second ex-
ample: Helper and helped are equal. Their common humanity is felt by 
both, even if it is through feelings of inadequacy and embarrassment, in 
this case. How important is this in the field of ethics of Solidarity? Is 
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mutual recognition more or less important than social empowerment? 
More or less than finding the right treatment of a disease, for example? 
Recognition belongs to a different field from where material needs are 
met5. It belongs rather to a social part of the self, a part that is injured, or 
at least, endangered, in situations of necessity. That is why the need of 
recognition, although being universal, is more intensely felt among the 
poor, among those who try to help them and those who reflect on how 
to do it, like the above quoted articles (Román’s and Feilinger’s) clearly 
express. At the light of George Orwell’s texts, the need of recognition 
seems to be at least as important as any other. Or even more: without 
recognition, help becomes an affront6.
The term recognition is probably better than the more traditional 
term equality. Both Orwell and Failinger would concur. Failinger, in 
discussing how to offer legal assistance to low-income clients, said that 
‘the ethics of solidarity demands that we do not totalize the other. It is 
built on mutuality, not on identity; we are committed to each other not 
because of identical interests but because of similar ones. We are fellow 
travelers, but not because we go down the same road together. Rather, 
our lives intersect at critical moments of encounter, when we are bound 
to each other in a moment of action whether we like it or not. Solidarity 
respects both bonds and distances, both continuities of terrain and vast 
gulfs between people, trying to imagine how to act, to work together, in 
a way that respects both’ (Failinger 1999: 2121). Recognition, or ‘solidar-
ity’ as Failinger expresses it, has to do more with mutuality than with 
identity.
There are, according to Failinger, distances and gulfs between the 
help-giver and the help-receiver that need to be respected, that is, that 
don’t need to disappear. As much of a socialist as he was, Orwell would 
reach the same conclusion about preserving distances and finding ways 
to work together, about being just fellow travelers. When he wrote his 
controversial The Road to Wigan Pier (1936), he was brave enough to 
5 Meulen (2016: 528): “Health care policies and arrangements should go 
beyond merely meeting needs and rights by exploring how people’s personal 
dignity and sense of belonging can be sustained within relations of recognition, 
reciprocity, and support”.
6 According to Margalit, a society that helps those in need is not necessarily a decent 
society (1996: 523): “If humiliating means damaging people’s self-respect, it should be 
clear that a society that does not humiliate its members is a necessary condition for a 
just society”. Providing for material necessities only doesn’t constitute real help. 
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discuss the issue of social class distinctions, which was already a delicate 
subject at that time, a time when class distinctions were much more in-
tensely felt than nowadays. The issue has not vanished today, though. It 
lies behind Failinger’s quotation. What does she refer to when she men-
tions ‘gulfs’ and ‘distances’ between the help giver and the receiver?
She means tastes, aspirations, ways of seeing the world, and all that 
depends on education and, ultimately, on the class one belongs to – even 
if, by a democratic prejudice that aims at suppressing realities by suppress-
ing words, we don’t use the term ‘class’ anymore. Orwell saw it clearly 
(CW 5: 149-50):
‘It is easy for me to say that I want to get rid of class-distinctions, but 
nearly everything I think and do is a result of class-distinctions. All my 
notions –notions of good and evil, of pleasant and unpleasant, of funny and 
serious, of ugly and beautiful– are essentially middle-class notions (…). When 
I grasp this I grasp that it is no use clapping a proletarian on the back and 
telling him that he is as good a man as I am; if I want real contact with him, 
I have got to make an effort for which very likely I am unprepared.’
The effort would entail altering oneself to a point in which one would 
become a different person. Orwell implies that this is as difficult as un-
necessary. When Orwell wrote The Road to Wigan Pier he had already 
spent a long time among tramps, and in documenting the book, he got 
to know the living and working conditions of the miners in northern 
England. Orwell knew all levels of the social hierarchy: he was a member 
of the middle-class by birth, that had been to Eton and to the slums. He 
could claim for himself –although he did not– the epistemic privilege of 
the marginalized together with an upper-class education. According to 
Orwell, one did not have to drop class distinctions, i.e., the world view 
of his social position, in order to work together with people of other 
social identities, of other class:
‘If you belong to the bourgeoisie, don’t be too eager to bound forward 
and embrace your proletarian brothers; they may not like it, and if they 
show that they don’t like it you will probably ﬁnd that your class-preju-
dices are not so dead as you imagined. And if you belong to the prole-
tariat, by birth or in the sight of God, don’t sneer too automatically at 
the Old School Tie; it covers loyalties which can be useful to you if you 
know how to handle them.’ (CW 5: 215)
Recognition keeps distances, recognition is not identity. Recognition 
experiences are perfectly compatible with a full awareness of personal and 
social differences.
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This vision was utterly confirmed, in Orwell’s case, during his par-
ticipation in the Spanish Civil War. Orwell arrived in Catalonia in late 
December 1936. According to his Homage to Catalonia, one of the most 
deeply settled memories he got from those days sprung from a fortuitous 
encounter with a militiaman, one day before Orwell himself joined the 
militia. ‘Something in his face deeply moved me (…). There were both 
candor and ferocity in it; also the pathetic reverence illiterate people have 
for their supposed superiors’ (Orwell 2001: 31). It was an Italian of 
twenty-five or twenty-six, trying hardly to understand some military 
information he was being given; according to Orwell, he just could not. 
Someone pointed Orwell to him and they briefly engaged one another 
is a short conversation in Spanish. When Orwell left the room afterwards, 
the Italian stepped across the room for a hand shake, gripping his hand 
very hard.
‘Queer, the affection you can feel for a stranger! It was as though his 
spirit and mine had momentarily succeeded in bridging the gulf of language 
and tradition and meeting in utter intimacy. I hoped he liked me as well 
as I liked him’. (CW 6, 1)
Orwell was so impressed by this experience of recognition, such a 
powerful epiphany of the common humanity, that he even would write 
a poem on the experience (CW 13: 510-511). It would seem that his 
memories of the war were dotted, here and there, by similar experiences. 
Even in the middle of war action he was willing to recognize fellow-human 
beings among the enemy ranks. He once had the chance to shoot an 
enemy soldier, but he refrained from it. Republican aviation had started 
to fly over “Fascist” positions, and the Francoist troops were running 
away:
‘At this moment a man, presumably carrying a message to an officer, 
jumped out of the trench and ran along the top of the parapet in full view. 
He was half-dressed and was holding up his trousers with both hands as 
he ran. I refrained from shooting at him (…) partly because of that detail 
about the trousers. I had come here to shoot at “Fascists”; but a man who 
is holding up his trousers isn’t a “Fascist”, he is visibly a fellow creature, 
similar to yourself, and you don’t feel like shooting at him’. (CW 13: 
501)
Again another detail gives out common humanity, in this case, between 
enemies engaged in killing one another. The humanity of the “Fascist” 
is revealed by the fact the he was holding up his trousers with both hands, 
running away in a very comical way.
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What refrained Orwell from shooting was, according to himself, the 
fact that his aim was not very good, plus the fact that the weapons the 
militias had been given were old and bad beyond description, and could 
not be trusted. And to make things worse, Orwell and his fellow militia-
men had abandoned their positions, and had to make the best of the fact 
that the “Fascists” were running away instead of engaging fire from an 
unsheltered place. They simply drew back. All kinds of reasons for not 
firing can be called upon in such situation. Orwell chooses to point at the 
trousers. Like in his narrative “A Hanging”, something that should not 
be there, something that escapes protocol –the protocol of a war, that in 
the Sportsmanlike-Etonian spirit of Orwell included shooting at enemies 
ready to shoot at you– reveals the existence of human beings. But the 
story is significant because common humanity is revealed by the fact that 
the man was defecating when the Republican aviation forced him to move. 
Which means: common humanity is revealed at its best when the fact 
that man is slave to his necessities is forced upon the observer.
3. LACK OF RECOGNITION AND ITS ROOTS
Orwell, in his book on his experiences as a tramp (1933):
‘Fear of the mob is a superstitious fear. It is based on the idea that there 
is some mysterious, fundamental difference between rich and poor, as 
though they were two different races, like negroes and white men. But 
in reality there is no such difference. The mass of the rich and the poor 
are differentiated by incomes and nothing else, and the average millionaire 
is only the average dishwasher dressed in a new suit. Change places, and 
handy dandy, which is the justice, which is the thief? Everyone who has 
mixed on equal terms with the poor knows this quite well’. (CW 1: 121)
On the one hand, man’s submission to necessity, manifested in the 
previous war story, leads to recognition of human fellowship. On the 
other hand, though, such revelation is usually rejected. Simply because 
no one likes to be reminded of his or her inescapable submission to neces-
sity. To Orwell, everyone who has mixed in equal terms with the poor 
knows he is slave to necessity. But who has mixed in equal terms with 
the poor? How many have the epistemic privilege of knowing, not in a 
theoretical or rhetorical way, to be subject to necessity? Only from an 
unsheltered position, common subjection to necessity is revealed. But 
only a few people are willing to be unsheltered. Everyone clings fiercely 
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to whatever lets him carry on with the fiction of being out of necessity, 
from his clothes to his money and education. That is why the rich tend 
to see the poor as a different kind of human beings, as racists do with men 
of other skin colors.
After leaving Spain, and after finishing the manuscript of Homage To 
Catalonia, Orwell had a new bout of pulmonary affection. It was an-
other of a series of episodes that had been weakening him since his child-
hood, and that would eventually kill him at the age of forty-six. He spent 
six months in a sanatorium in Kent, and the doctors recommended him 
to spend some months in a dry country. He and his wife found the 
money and they travelled to Morocco. During his six months stay in that 
country, he was able finish his Coming Up For Air (which he published 
in 1939), and on returning to England he wrote and published about the 
country they had been living in. A very special experience of recognition 
is consigned in his Moroccan diary:
‘Another day I was feeding the gazelles in the public gardens with 
bread when an Arab employee of the local authorities who was doing 
navvy work nearby came up to me and asked for a piece of the bread. I 
gave it to him and he pocketed it gratefully’. (CW 11: 209)
Although it seems to be a petty anecdote, Orwell would write about 
it in an extended way later on7. Orwell had not really noticed the man 
before he asked for bread. It seemed to him that the Arab employee was 
just there to take a close look at the gazelles; it was when he discovered 
that he was fascinated for the bread rather than for the animals that the 
episode became significant. Orwell would describe it to make the point 
that Morocco was such a poor a country that it could not even afford to 
pay more than starvation wages to its employees. But it is easy to see that 
real recognition only took place when the man in question revealed his 
state of necessity.
To what extent are our procedures so crafted that our common state 
of necessity is overlooked? Patients at hospitals are reduced to data so that 
the treatments are as quick and efficient as possible: doctors interact with 
data rather than with people. By ignoring the human essential need of 
recognition, by ignoring man’s subjection to necessity, modern insistence 
on procedure (that comes from the utilitarian and the technical mind), 
has shaped an efficient world that has made recognition almost impossible. 
If I go down the street and find someone who has been a victim of vio-
7 CW 11: 417 ‘Marrakech’, New Writing, New Series n.3, Christmas 1939
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lence, I will not, probably, just pass by. What I will do is dial an emer-
gency number in my cellphone and they will send the police and an 
ambulance. This is alright, because the victim is going to be helped.
But I will not have taken any chance with that stranger: I will not even 
need to interact with him. Thanks to procedure, those who help him will 
be able to do it without needing to acknowledge him. None of us are 
going to step out of a sheltered position, no one is going to be helpless in 
helping.
And the procedure will run smoothly as long as the patient does not 
act like a human being, i.e., as long as he does not reveal any idiosyncrasy, 
as long as he does not do any unexpected move, like the Fascist who was 
holding his trousers, or the prisoner who stepped aside to avoid a puddle.
What lies behind all recognition problems is the lack of Self-Recogni-
tion. After coming back from Morocco, Orwell started working at the 
BBC for a couple of years (from 1941 to 1943). The second world war 
had broken out and he saw it as a way of contributing to the war effort, 
as much as he hated propaganda and lamented to perspective of having 
less time to work on his own writings. He only managed to publish 
Animal Farm in 1945. By 1946 he started devising his Nineteen Eighty-
Four, and he finished it in 1948 under extreme bad health, due to his old 
pulmonary issues. By the time he was finishing the typing of his manu-
script, he was very ill. He spent his last year of life in two different sana-
toriums. His lack of good health and the perspective of death leaked into 
this last novel. Of course that does not explain the book, which is rich 
and complex, and has basically a constructive political purpose. But for 
the purposes of this article we need to call attention to the fact that Orwell 
had to face mortality in a way not everyone does.
Our one last claim: It is the reluctance to accept our own state of need, 
our own mortality, that in the end explains all our difficulties with rec-
ognition.
The ‘Ecce Homo’ passages in Nineteen Eighty-Four appear in the 
third and last section of the novel. In it, Winston Smith, the main char-
acter, has been arrested and is submitted to a long, brutal physical and 
psychological torture to make him abandon his beliefs of the autonomous 
individual, his convictions on the existence of right and wrong and even 
his faith in the existence of objective truth. All of these things have to be 
wiped out to turn him into a perfect unit of the totalitarian régime, so 
perfect that it doesn’t allow the smallest dissention, even if it only takes 
places inside the skull of a solitary and ineffectual rebel.
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Little by little, all of Smith’s convictions are obliterated by his 
torturer O’Brien, the figure of a perverted Socrates, through a cruel 
combination of pain-infliction and pedagogical conversation. At some 
point, Smith claims that the sole persecution of power can’t keep a 
régime going for long; a régime solely based on oppression will lack 
vitality at some point. Even if he can’t find any other argument, he 
still holds a belief in ‘The spirit of Man’, a spirit inside people that 
would counteract the cruelties and put an end to the oppression some-
how. When O’Brien asks him ‘Do you consider yourself a Man?’, 
Winston replies affirmatively. But then Smith has to admit that before 
his detention, he promised to act as cruelly as his oppressors –which 
is an attack to his own belief of being a representative of the ‘spirit of 
man’, and a reason for killing any feelings of superiority above them–
, and then is given the final lesson: If he considers himself the last man 
for rejecting the inhuman world the totalitarians have set, he will have 
to take a look at his ruined physical appearance after weeks of torture 
and starvation:
“Look at the condition you are in!” he said. “Look at this filthy grime 
all over your body. Look at the dirt between your toes. Look at the 
disgusting running sore on your leg. Do you know that you stink like a 
goat? Probably you have ceased to notice it.
Look at your emaciation. Do you see? I can make my thumb and 
forefinger meet around your bicep. I could snap your neck like a carrot 
(…). Do you see that face facing you?
That is the last man. If you are a human being, that is humanity.” 
(CW 9: 285)
The reflection in the mirror comes as a shock to the prisoner, and it 
contributes, almost definitively, to the crushing of all his beliefs. What 
destroys Smith at this stage of his re-education is simply the lack of self-
recognition in the face of his own naked existence. He has lost his human 
appearance and that is more than enough to make him falter; his belief 
in Humanity doesn’t pass the test of naked existence.
Orwell was counting on the readers’ sympathy with Smith’s predica-
ment. And rightly so: if this particular passage is poignant –or cheaply 
sensational and outrageous, depending on each one’s sensitivity– it is be-
cause all of us tend to resist the sight of ourselves as pure subjects to neces-
sity. Orwell knew of this reluctance from when the time he was a tramp 
and had to experience how those who helped the poor were actually 
trying to protect themselves from them. He knew that the millionaire 
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who considered the poor a different breed of man was only rejecting the 
image of his own naked existence.
This is, I think, a deeply-settled Humanist prejudice in our culture. 
We tend to believe in Humanity but only to the brim of naked exist-
ence. Beyond that point, we also begin to falter. It would seem that our 
liberal-humanist mind is able to attribute to man all kinds of godlike 
capacities, which are the source of our blind faith in the economic-
technological growth, but does it at the price of forgetting our subjection 
to necessity.
Our humanist faith in growth and technology only survives at the 
price of burying the Ecce homo, as if it was not a part of what we are. 
Which comes with a huge price to pay in the field of Ethics of solidarity.
4. ETHICS OF SOLIDARITY
When a culture has rejected the idea of man as a subject of need, and 
potentially, a victim of necessity, it is no wonder it has also lost the capac-
ity of helping those who are in need, even willing to do it, even by tech-
nically doing it. Western culture has left it all in the hands of the techni-
cal set of mind when it comes to meeting human needs; but the need for 
recognition cannot be met by any technological procedure. It depends 
on human beings caring for other human beings and discovering in them 
their common humanity. And even that depends on those human beings 
being able to acknowledge their own deep state of necessity.
Even if procedures were improved in searching for improving recog-
nition, if some measures were taken to force the doctors, lawyers, etc., 
to talk with their clients, it would be still necessary to have professionals 
willing to act in an unprofessional way to allow for idiosyncrasies, un-
predictable acts, delays and setbacks of all kinds which are the mark of 
humanity. Everything would still depend on individuals.
One thing appears to be particularly difficult: that there is a major 
swing in western culture, in Humanist culture, that allows the figure of 
the Ecce Homo surface and co-exist with the demi-god some Humanists 
consider man to be. The two images are incompatible, since the first one 
speaks of man as a subject of necessity, and the second one is the dream 
of a man liberated from necessity. Therefore, as for now, we can only 
count on the individual’s commitment in order to make recognition more 
frequent, and help really helpful.
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